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Theory of Determinants
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Abstract
Journalism is thought by many scholars to have an immense effect in controlling 
corruption. However, they do not know the conditions under which its performance 
brings about positive results in some countries while serving to protect corrupt 
policies and corrupt policy makers in some other countries. Journalism combats 
corruption through its content, freedom, structure, independence, ownership 
patterns, diversity, ethics, and professionalism, all of which demonstrate significant 
variations across cultures and nations. As a social institution, journalism does 
not work in a vacuum. Its impact is heavily determined by a variety of interacting 
variables characterizing both the nation system and international system in which 
it operates. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a hierarchical universal theory 
of journalism-corruption determinants. The theory perceives corruption act as an 
outcome of a continuous interaction between five hierarchical levels. They are: (1) 
journalistic level, (2) economic level, (3) political level, (4) cultural level, and (5) 
international system level. In general, each level has many sublevels interacting with 
each other to bring about an effect on corruption that could be negative or positive, 
minor or major, and finally in one domain or multiple domains. The suggested 
theory is based on a critically assessment revision of the current literature in several 
disciplines. The ultimate purpose is to create linkages capable to explain corruption, 
predict it, direct the future studies, and finally contribute to reducing it.
Keywords: journalism and corruption fighting, hierarchical theory of determinants, 
press freedom, investigative journalism, watchdog journalism, media ownership, 
democracy, media diversity, international double standards, economic development, 
corruption perception index, political corruption
1. Introduction
Research on journalism and corruption has proliferated in the past two decades, 
but it is largely unconnected and its conceptual and theoretical framework is 
far from complete. As such, upcoming research will be of little value in either 
understanding corruption or curbing its consequences. Corruption is a universal 
global problem with detrimental effects on economic growth and performance [1], 
political stability, and societal integration [1–3]. Despite the dominant satisfaction 
of the correlation between a large set of variables and corruption, controversial 
results seem to be quite common due to differences in definitions [4, 5], sources [6], 
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measures, research designs, models, cultures, types of corruption control [7], and 
period of studies [6–9]. This general controversy is deeply applicable to the litera-
ture of journalism and corruption where several empirical and theoretical studies 
yield dramatically contradicting results. The existing literature lacks consensus on 
why it exists, its determinants, consequences, and more importantly, what makes it 
so differently widespread among cultures and countries [10].
In such a context, it would be important to develop a universal theory that 
embraces conceptual grounds of journalism and corruption. Yet, without consider-
ing the intricate interconnections between journalism and other related intervening 
variables of the higher socioeconomic levels/layers, such a theory would be mislead-
ing. Journalism is thought by many scholars to have an immense effect in controlling 
corruption. However, they do not know the conditions under which its performance 
brings about positive results in some countries while serving to protect corrupt 
policies and corrupt policy makers in some other countries. Journalism combats 
corruption through its content, freedom, structure, independence, ownership 
patterns, diversity, ethics, and professionalism, all of which demonstrate significant 
variations across cultures and nations. As a social institution, journalism does not 
work in a vacuum; its impact is heavily determined by both the nation system and 
international system environments in which it operates [11–13].
A multidisciplinary method, I argue, is the most appropriate approach to 
synthesize the key variables and underlying relationships across a set of published 
studies in a variety of disciplines to arrive at a theory of journalism-corruption 
determinants. A theory that discusses how multiple levels of determinants might 
be linked, or at least juxtaposed to yield a more comprehensive understanding of 
causes, and consequences of corruption and that can lead to more effective policy 
reforms. What I intend to do is to examine and move a body of knowledge forward 
to understand, interpret, predict, and finally help control the penetration of the 
most dangerous ill humanity has experienced since its establishment. The worst 
aspect about corruption is the nature of corruption itself. It takes so many different 
forms and covers such a variety of public and private activities that often is dif-
ficult for the common man or accountability agencies to detect what it really is. The 
corrupt officials are efficient at disguising their behaviors and covering over any 
traces. Moreover, it is very contagious. Corruption in one sphere of public or private 
domain quickly spreads to and penetrates in another like wildfire [14].
Corruption is an undeserved, unfair, unjust, immoral benefit resulting from 
positions of public trust and responsibility used for unworthy behaviors. It violates 
any notion of public responsibility on which the construction of democracy is 
built [14]. Despite the fact that corruption reality is compacted, complicated, dif-
fused, and penetrated among all sectors and layers of the society, studies are often 
designed and carried out independently [15]. What complicates corruption research 
is that its causes in one discipline or level of analysis could be examined as a con-
sequence in other discipline or level of analysis [8]. The single act of corruption 
within a small or big public or private corporation could be traced through several 
determinants within the corporation itself, the constitutional and legal system, 
structure of the economy, politics, culture, rule of law, in addition to historical roots 
of a given country in relation to colonialism, among many other factors and forces.
The suggested theory, then, will be designed in hierarchical levels in which the 
upper level, the macro level, is supposed to influence the lower level and so on. As 
Shoemaker and Rees argue, the hierarchy of influences model is useful for research 
in two important respects. First, any single perspective does not offer a comprehen-
sive view, which is possible only when all levels affecting the variables under study 
are considered. Massive studies are conducted at a specific level, but findings are 
explained at higher levels. Second, merging multiple hierarchal levels of analysis 
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provide distinct explanations and direct the attention to the interplay between them 
[16]. In addition, as most of corruption behaviors occur within the transaction 
process between actors at different systems within and sometimes outside a given 
country, the multiple hierarchal levels of study is, perhaps, the only suitable method 
that detects different causes behind the illegal behaviors. The suggested theory 
is in line with what many authors believe about corruption. Political corruption, 
for example, is rooted in the social structure. The state of willingness for political 
corruption depends less on the psychological or personality characteristics of the 
individual public servant, and more on the socioeconomic environment and insti-
tutional context in which the state and the market are constructed. Furthermore, 
readiness for corruption is not constant in a public official, and can actually vary 
over time within the same person depending on the context he/she is found [17].
Literature on corruption is mainly divided between research that emphasizes 
either the influence of structure (determinism), or the influence of agency (free-
dom), on human thought processes and behaviors. While agency stands for the 
capacity of an individual to freely make his/her own independent choice, structure 
refers to factors such as economy, institution, religion, history, social class, and 
culture that influence the choices of an individual [18]. The rational choice theory 
represents the foundation for studies adopting the influence of agency. The unit of 
analysis is the individual who chooses a specific course of action on a short term 
as a rational action to satisfy his/her self-interest. Though this school of thought 
provides good reasons to study the motivation behind the corruption behavior of 
public officials, it has its own limitations that make it unsuitable to explain the com-
plexities of this behavior (for more details on the limitations of the rational choice 
theory, see Monroe, 1991) [19]. Therefore, scholars have turned to the structural 
factors to overcome the shortcoming of the individual-based theory of corruption. 
My approach is also informed by the argument made by Michael Johnston in his 
book: Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. He outstandingly 
criticizes the current corruption literature that either adopts cross-sectional ana-
lytical traditions often applying statistical measures and models to large numbers 
of countries or the case studies that focus the investigation on specific context. The 
two approaches have their limits that never allows to appropriate understanding 
of corruption. Johnston, instead, suggests a middle level of comparison—one that 
does not deny the benefits of these two traditions but links them together [20]. My 
conviction is that no one approach holds all advantages, and that every approach 
has its own limitations and shortcomings that require a combination of multi-sys-
tems/layers interactive approach. Corruption is extremely entrenched in the basic 
historical, political, and cultural structures. This approach is in line with a growing 
body of historical institutionalism stressing the importance of moving away from 
examining corruption as individualistic behavior to focus on the informal rules and 
routines that enforce individuals to act according to these norms [21, 22]. Historical 
institutionalism, in general, is an analytical approach that pays attention to the ways 
by which institutions shape and structure behaviors [23]. At this point, it would be 
useful to identify the phenomenon with which I am concerned.
2. What is corruption?
Corruption as dependent variable here implies that things, behaviors, and policies 
are not what they ought to be. They have been deviant from the normal and expected 
paths. In the process of so deviating, the corrupt have unfairly and intentionally gained 
in some way that should not have happened or would not otherwise have occurred 
at the expense of everyone else, who, significantly, have thereby been disadvantaged 
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[14]. The existence of corruption requires three elements to simultaneously coexist: 
first, the powerful person who has a discretionally power; second, an economic rent 
linked to this authority; and third, low probability of detection by the judicial system 
[24]. Klitgaard presents an elegant understanding of the determinants of corruption 
that views it as the ultimate output of the interaction between three pillars: monopoly 
power, discretion, and accountability. Its existence requires little or no accountability 
mechanisms, and presence of both imperfect competitive markets and discretion [25]. 
The corrupt behavior may be either passive or active. That is when the law is not totally 
or partly imposed or when the public official intentionally applies it selectively and 
unfairly to favor some persons or some organizations over others in the transaction 
processes [26]. In a corrupt country, public resources are more likely directed toward 
protecting the elite of the corrupt regime—the armed forces, the police, the execu-
tives, and other cliques of social control—as the regime seeks to perpetuate its control. 
This is why corruption is usually defined as the criminal misuse of power. A corrupt 
individual occupies higher social, political, and economic status [27]. Given this fact, 
it is expected that corruption precludes the socioeconomic development expenditure 
and widens the gap between the rich and the poor population [28].
In this context, it would also be useful to distinguish between grand corruption 
on the one hand and petty corruption on the other. The first has been defined as the 
misuse of public power by heads of state, ministers, and senior officials for private 
financial gain [29]. The second refers to bribes citizens pay to lower level officials to 
speed the delivery of services or to fasten the appropriate guidelines [30]. Obviously, 
the huge and rapidly growing literature around corruption bears a conceptual bias 
when it confines it to public sector and defines it from a state perspective. Reviewing 
literature of the conceptual framework of this key term in economy, sociology, politi-
cal science, and so forth ignores the reality of corruption in private sphere [31].
In most of cross-country comparative studies, corruption indices of 
Transparency International (TI) are used to measure and compare corruption. This 
is a composite index including many other sources. Some studies used data from 
other individual sources, that is, the Political Risk Service (PRS), the Institute for 
Management Development (IMD), the World Bank and University of Basel (WB/
UB), or the World Economic Forum (WEF). For a description of these sources, see 
Lambsdorff [32, 33]. An older source has been compiled by Business International 
[1]. In their studies on typology of corruption, Bussell [34] argued for not using 
one single shared typology across all analyses, as it is highly unlikely that a single 
typology will be sufficient for all research questions. Given the complex nature of 
corruption, they argued for a more practical, problem-driven approach. Corruption 
as Helman [35] argues is a derivative concept, meaning that it depends on a theory 
of the institution involved. In order to define corruption of an official or institution, 
one needs an explanation of how the official ought to behave or how the institution 
ought to function. Corruption can and is being measured through a wide variety of 
innovative approaches. It is appropriate to rely on a wide variety of different indica-
tors, both subjective and objective, individual as well as aggregate, cross-country as 
well as country-specific. This is important to monitor results on the ground, assess 
the concrete reality of corruption, and develop anticorruption programs [2]. The 
variety of approaches through which corruption has to be defined and insufficiency 
of any or group of approaches may urge me to suggest a flexible definition for this 
phenomenon to mean what people perceive in a particular culture as corruption.
3. Levels of analysis
The levels of analysis in journalism-corruption determinants can be thought of 
as forming a continuum ranging from micro to macro, from the smallest units of 
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a system to the largest. A micro level study examines corruption act as an activity 
practiced by an individual or a specific social institution occupies the lower level 
of the hierarchical influences. This could be a public official, a newspaper, or other 
journalism outlet that affects another firm or level. A macro level study examines 
social and political structures that exist in higher layers of the hierarchy. These 
levels operate hierarchically: What happens at the lower levels is determined by 
what occurs at higher levels to cause or deter the corruption behavior of an indi-
vidual official or a particular system. For more details on how hierarchical levels of 
analysis work and guide research, see Shoemaker and Reese [16]. The rest of this 
chapter examines from several perspectives findings and explanations relating to 
determinants of corruption at different hierarchical levels. The main argument 
of “the hierarchical universal theory of journalism-corruption determinants” as 
introduced here perceives corruption act as an outcome of a continuous interaction 
between five hierarchical levels as shown in the graph below. They are: (1) jour-
nalistic level, (2) economic level, (3) political level, (4) cultural level, and (5) the 
international system level. In general, each level has many sublevels interacting with 
each other to bring about an effect on corruption that could be negative or positive, 
minor or major, and finally in one domain or multiple domains. It is understood also 
that the magnitude of lower level impact is weaker than that of the higher level. It is 
not expected, for example, that influence of journalism, as institution to be stronger 
than that of the political system or cultural system.
Given the discussions outlined in the preceding paragraphs, I will move through 
a sequence of four steps. The purpose of the first step is to identify the number and 
Figure 1. 
The hierarchal universal theory of journalism/corruption determinants.
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domains of the interacting hierarchal levels—as shown earlier—that sustain and/or 
restrain corruption. The second step aims at reviewing the empirical and theoreti-
cal studies that examine the main relevant variables and issues. The purpose of the 
third step is to present the generalizations summarizing the main findings. The 
fourth step intends to synthesize the main cross-border assumptions; a theory that 
creates linkages capable to explain corruption, predict it, direct the future studies, 
and finally contribute to reducing it (Figure 1).
4. Journalistic level
At this first level of the hierarchal theory, the revision will confine to conditions 
and functions of journalism that have distinct implications for corruption determi-
nants, consequences, and policy reforms. In theory, conditions are different from 
functions, they are the elements and characteristics that enable or disable journal-
ism as a social institution in the fight against corruption. Freedom, independence, 
and diversity are the main conditions of journalism that empower it to perform the 
functions of (1) watchdog, (2) accountability, and (3) agenda-setter. These condi-
tions and functions relate to the existence of corruption, its diffusion and control.
5. Conditions
A commonly held belief is that a free and independent press serves as deterrent 
to corruption due to its ability to detect corrupt behaviors and officials. A number 
of recent papers that consider the relationship between press freedom and corrup-
tion lend support to this conviction. Ahrend [36] finds that lower levels of press 
freedom are correlated with higher levels of corruption, a result that is supported by 
Chowdhury [37], Stapenhurst [38, 39], and Bojanic [40] who explained the posi-
tive effect of press freedom in the presence of democracy [40]. The overwhelming 
majority of empirical studies support the theoretical view that restrictions to press 
freedom lead to higher corruption and that political and economic restrictions are 
strongly and robustly related to corruption [41]. This view is totally supported in 
OPEC members where journalism was not serving as a check against corruption due 
to the restrictions imposed on its ownership and performance [42].
The most rigorous work in this respect is that of Brunetti and Weder [43] in 
which they use alternative measures for both the independent and dependent 
variables. They carry out several robustness checks utilizing two different press 
freedom indexes and four different measures of corruption, across countries as well 
as over time. The results show significant positive effects of press freedom on three 
of the four corruption control indices. Their results confirm the widely held belief 
that in countries where the press is mainly free from any sort of restrictions, corrup-
tion levels are likely to be low [43]. Though freedom of the press is a prerequisite to 
combat corruption, without citizens’ access to and participation in press content, 
its impact would be at its minimum. The results of Dutta and Roy’s study present 
empirical evidence that these two components of the press—freedom and access—
complement each other in controlling corruption [44].
In a different thread of research, Graber [45] demonstrates that the press 
often deserve less recognition than previously believed for detecting corruption. 
Similarly, Vaidya [46] indicates that the government-press relationship in differ-
ent parts of the world appears to suggest a more complex relationship. It might 
not serve as a watchdog for the public but might prefer to enter in a partnership 
with corrupt officials. However, not all forms of restrictions to press freedom 
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are strongly correlated with corruption. More specifically, it appears that it is the 
political pressures that have a slightly stronger effect on corruption [46]. Lindstedt 
and Naurin [47] contend that in order for transparency to alleviate corruption, the 
audience should receive the information made available through transparency and 
they must have the capacity to hold corrupt officials accountable. Transparency on 
its own has no or little impact to prevent or control corruption.
In this context, two competing views on the relation between perception of 
corruption and actual corruption deserve more elaboration. The first view sees 
that higher levels of corruption’s perception led citizens to hold their governments 
accountable through democratic mechanisms and, specifically, the electoral process. 
This view hinges on the assumption that higher perception of corruption corre-
sponds to a higher level of actual corruption, and that press is independent and the 
public uses its power to punish the government. Perception is a function of press 
coverage for corruption in real world and the role of the press will be to decrease it 
[48]. The second view implies that heightened perception of corruption can increase 
its actual level by publicizing the view of corruption as a normal activity and 
therefore lower the threshold of inhibition for others to engage in the same kind of 
behavior. Proponents of this view argue that more perception of corruption threat-
ens state legitimacy and creates credibility and trust crises in the state [49].
In fact, existing literature as a whole emphasizes the significant impact of the free 
press as a highly effective mechanism of external control on corruption because it 
works not only against extortive but also against collusive corruption [43]. Extortive 
corruption as explained by Brunetti and Weder [43] happens when the government 
official has the discretionary power to refuse or delay a service in order to extract a 
rent from the private agent in the form of a bribe. The collusive corruption occurred 
when the official and the client have mutual interests and the two partners benefit 
from the transaction. Generally, press freedom is highly correlated with low levels 
of corruption, but its effectiveness is only related to collusive corruption [43]. Free 
press is a prerequisite for investigative journalism, which in turn is a fundamental 
mechanism contributing to both vertical and horizontal accountability. Journalism 
as institution would be of little value in curbing corruption unless it is free, inde-
pendent, and plural. Leaders of international economic bodies such as the World 
Bank have paid attention to the importance of press freedom as the core of the 
equitable development [50]. This positive attitude has coincided with publication of 
several articles that demonstrate a strong correlation between a free press and low 
corruption levels across countries [50]. Ahrend [50], for example, provides a strong 
empirical evidence indicating that causation runs mainly from lower levels of press 
freedom to higher levels of corruption.
The free press investigates wrongdoing, feeds the public sphere with the con-
sequences of corruption behaviors and forms public opinion. This emphatically 
pressures the governmental bodies especially the judiciary to hold corrupt officials 
accountable [51]. As a result, in democratic countries, corrupt officials are forced to 
resign and lose their power. This significant role takes place where a combination of 
free press, democracy, and rule of law exists. Evidence on such a collaborative role is 
presented by Hamada, Abdel-Salam, and Elkilany who find that the interaction of 
press freedom, democracy, and rule of law reduces corruption. Furthermore, they 
obtain that the effect of rule of law is not contingent on freedom of the press; rule of 
law affects corruption both in countries where the press is free and where it is unfree 
[52]. In a similar vein, Besley and Prat [53] test and verify their model, which links a 
number of characteristics of journalism industry, namely concentration and owner-
ship and obvious political outcomes, namely capture, corruption, and turnover. The 
model is based on three propositions: (1) media pluralism works against capture, (2) 
independent ownership minimizes capture, and (3) media capture lessens political 
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outcomes. They conclude that laws of press freedom are not sufficient to protect 
journalism from government interference. Consistent with this, Djankov finds that 
countries with greater state ownership of the press have less freedom, fewer political 
rights for citizens, inferior governance, and less developed capital markets [54]. In 
general, press freedom and democratization have a symbiotic relationship. Both go 
hand in hand, and where democracy exists, press assumes its free and critical evalu-
ation of wrongdoing and vice versa. What is not clearly known is the conditions 
under which these two close variables interact. Historically, a free press requires its 
independence from the state and the private sector, a kind of independence that 
enables it to act as an indirect check on corruption that would otherwise flourish 
in the absence of competitive environment. By creating a diversified atmosphere 
absorbing different views and enriching a free public debate, journalism sustains 
political and economic competition, the necessary condition for a clean economic 
and political environment with a minimum level of corruption [38].
6. Functions
It has long been recognized that journalism plays a key role in curbing corrup-
tion. This is because of its fundamental role in enabling citizens to monitor the 
actions of the government officials. This, in turn, rationalizes the voting behavior of 
the citizens to the extent that they can punish the corrupt and unresponsive govern-
ments. Literature offers two models linking journalism to corruption. The first has 
been developed by Stromberg [55] focusing on the impact of journalism on policy 
issues including corruption. The main concept of the model implies that when 
voters are deprived from free flow of journalism information, they are not likely 
informed citizens, and the government is more likely to allocate resources that do 
not serve the interest of people. It also sets policies that are associated with higher 
rents and corruption [55].
Besley and Prat [53] present the second model in which voters who have been 
informed by a free press can vote corrupt officials out of office, but where, at the 
same time, corrupt politicians can capture and silence the press. The latter deprives 
citizens of any possibility to form an enlightened voting, and hence increases the 
likelihood for corrupt government officials to continue in office. The model is in line 
with a long tradition of many political thinkers including Rousseau, Smith, Hobbes, 
Locke, Madison, Jefferson, and Mill who have argued that press freedom is a prereq-
uisite for citizens to make rational and knowledgeable decisions about public affairs 
[8]. Regardless of these two models, there are two ways through which journalism 
fights corruption: tangible and intangible. The first role is apparent when public 
office-holders are accused, or forced to resign after their crimes are exposed to 
public space. Investigative journalism that defends social and ethical norms, and 
intensifies competition, works as an indirect check against corruption [38]. Unlike 
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, journalism, as a fourth estate, has no spe-
cific means to sanction mismanagement of public officials [56]. Corruption flour-
ishes in the presence of cooperation among horizontal institutions of the state. The 
independent press can replace cooperation by disputes when it highlights corrup-
tion behaviors and thus create unfavorable atmosphere that eradicates corruption 
[38]. Through the watchdog function of journalism, three patterns of policy effects 
are generated: The first occurs when the government bodies discuss the problems 
raised by the press and take the procedures to present solutions. The second takes 
place if sanctions are applied against persons or institutions as a result of corruption 
or wrongdoing. The third happens when the parliament made changes in laws and 
legislations as a response to the investigate reports [57].
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The critical role of investigative journalism takes place when it exposes the gov-
ernment’s record to external scrutiny and critical evaluation, and holds authorities 
accountable for their actions [58]. Several studies offered empirical evidence [43] 
that watchdog role of journalists enhances the transparency of government actions 
and decisions, hinders misuse of public office, malfeasance, and thus reduces cor-
ruption [43, 58]. As Bovens argues, public accountability is a relationship between 
an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify 
his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences [59]. Traditionally, theorists of public accountability 
assume that governmental accountability incorporates a combination of vertical 
and horizontal institutions [60]. Vertical accountability describes a relationship 
between unequals where powerful superior actors hold less powerful inferior actors 
accountable or vice versa [61]. Forms of this type of accountability include electoral 
accountability, civil society, and journalism. Enlighted voter participation can pun-
ish the corrupt officials and replace the incumbent by electing a new government. 
The free press empowers voters and makes them aware of the corrupt behaviors 
and incumbents. As a result, they become more knowledgeable and their ability to 
hold elected officials accountable for their policy decisions enhanced. A variety of 
models also confirm the fact that policy distortion is a result of ill-informed citizens 
[62]. Horizontal accountability implies the power of checks and balances exercised 
by equals [60] where the three authorities of state-executive, legislative, and 
judiciary monitor each other. As an empirical investigation of this issue, Camaj [63] 
found that the free press has a greater indirect effect on corruption when coupled 
with strong institutions of horizontal accountability than when coupled with high 
electoral accountability. The main contribution of the free press to democratic 
governance lies in its ability to sustain political accountability [64].
If free press pressures public officials to be answerable for their behavior, forces 
them to justify their actions publically, and informs the citizenry about such investi-
gations, then it necessarily contributes to holding them accountable [64]. This hap-
pens through either its original informational role in which it identifies corruption 
acts and initiates the investigations or through a subsidy informational role in which 
it republishes the facts and information provided by other traditional intermediaries 
[65]. By the original and secondary informational roles, press contributes to hori-
zontal and vertical accountability [64]. The problem arises when the public in many 
countries lacks interest in politics and motivation to participate in elections. Here, 
the free press’ role is to hold the governors accountable—not to the public, but to the 
ideals and rules of the democratic polity itself [66]. This is particularly important 
given the fact that accountability mechanisms are fragile in many countries [67].
In such countries, social media provide an alternative that triggers accountability 
mechanisms in a large state-controlled press, limited political competition and 
censorship of traditional media [68]. Yet, social media role has to be accompanied 
by users’ interest in acquiring knowledge about corruption, their skills to process 
it adequately, and their motivation to participate in actions to change the corrupt 
behaviors [69]. Social media have tremendous power in turning public officials 
into symbols of wrongdoing, regardless of legal judgment and sanctions [67]. The 
preceding discussion shows that the mere existence of journalism does not mean 
anything unless it has access to sources of information and the ability to enlighten 
the public with what went wrong [70]. By doing so, press coverage influences 
norms, values, and cultures, which in turn can lead to transformation in politics, 
economy, and governance [71]. This cultural change happens over time as a cumula-
tive effect of continuous coverage of the press and through the cultivation of new 
standards of behaviors. Press is a crucial actor in the process of changing norms 
toward more transparency and accountability. By changing perceptions of what is 
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right and wrong, the press can lead to less or zero tolerance for corruption [71]. On 
the other hand, if journalism complies with the power of corrupt officials, ignores 
their intended failure and mismanagement, a culture of corruption tolerance 
prevails and it will be socially acceptable [72].
6.1 Generalizations
1. A strong association exists between free and independent press and corrup-
tion. The causation runs from higher level of free and independent press to 
lower corruption.
2. A strong relationship exists between restrictions to press freedom and corrup-
tion where more restrictions lead to higher corruption.
3. Higher public perception of corruption due to freedom of the press and politi-
cal competitiveness may not lead to controlling of corruption, unless civil 
mechanisms of accountability work properly. Alternatively, this situation may 
intensify the actual corruption as it delegitimizes the corruption behavior and 
views it as normal activity.
4. The political forms of restrictions are more effective in determining corruption 
than the economic or any other form of restrictions.
5. Press freedom and democracy are complements rather than substitutes in the 
fight against corruption.
6. The effect of press freedom in reducing corruption is magnified by the exis-
tence of democracy.
7. The watchdog role of the press hinges on the plurality of ownership patterns, 
diversity of views, and its credibility.
8. The watchdog journalism can contribute to the early public identification 
of corruption in which news analysis and information are made available to 
the public and authorities. It also has a secondary informational role through 
which it can republish information from other intermediaries.
9. Press freedom may have a greater indirect effect on corruption when interacted 
with strong mechanisms of horizontal accountability than when interacted 
with effective electoral accountability.
10. Transparency is an important, yet insufficient, factor to curb corruption and it 
does not prevent corruption if accountability agencies are weak.
11. More internet and digital media freedom decreases level of corruption only in 
democratic countries.
12. Social media improve vertical accountability more in countries where traditional 
journalism are captured and censored.
13. The impact of the level of free press in curbing corruption depends on the level 
of democracy. It is very effective in well-established electoral democracies, but 
less effective in newly established democracies, and it has little or no efficacy 
in a weak electoral democracy.
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7. The economic level
To a great extent, the level of corruption is an outcome of the degree of both 
monopoly and discretionary power that officials exercise. The two types of monopolies 
exist in highly regulated economies and definitely in developing countries where 
administrative rules and regulations are mainly imperfectly defined and overwhelmed 
by a weak rule of law. Corruption environment is also characterized by ineffective 
accountability and weak watchdog mechanisms. Empirically, more discretionary 
power and regulations equal more corruption [73]. Hence, effective strategies to con-
trol corruption have to simultaneously work on reducing officials’ monopoly power, 
their discretionary power, and strengthening their accountability through enabling the 
watchdog mechanisms [38]. Prior studies provide evidence that competitive econo-
mies are less corrupt than economies where domestic firms are protected from foreign 
competition. The results suggest that the policies aiming at making markets more 
competitive could play a role in controlling corruption [74]. This approach to cor-
ruption control suggests that increasing competition may be a way to reduce returns 
from corruption activities. Yet this argument is over simple as economists still have not 
fully identified the conditions under which an increase in competition will effectively 
reduce corruption [75].
In a similar thread of research, public choice theorists argue that corruption 
rates are directly corresponding to the degree of monopoly that public office 
officials have over a specific bureaucratic sphere. In contrast, a negative relation-
ship exists between accountability they bear and the rate of corruption [76]. Since 
officials in autocracies have monopoly power and discretionary power without any 
form of accountability, the risk of punishment associated with corruption is often 
zero [77]. However, consolidated autocracy differs from lenient autocratic gover-
nance as it applies rigid regulations that raise the cost of corruption practices to the 
extent that illegal bureaucratic corruption is often minimal [78].
In a different line of research, democracy and economic freedom prove to be 
real determinants of corruption. Meanwhile, there is not enough knowledge about 
how the interaction effect between democracy and economic freedom occurs or 
under which conditions the interaction represents a cure for corruption. Countries 
such as Hong Kong and Singapore exhibit a very low level of democracy and a 
very high level of economic freedom and at the same time have a very low level of 
corruption. On the other hand, in spite of India’s high level of democracy and low 
level of economic freedom, it experiences a very high level of corruption. Thus, it is 
of interest to ask how these two factors, that is, democracy and economic freedom 
work together in this process [79]. The answer to this question comes from the 
investigation of Saha and Gounder who found that the interaction effect of democ-
racy and economic freedom has a significant impact on controlling corruption. 
But the relationship is complex; democracy increases corruption at lower levels of 
economic freedom, yet in a full mature democracy, corruption is significantly lower 
[80]. This is consistent with other studies indicating that corruption control is more 
likely if an economic development is attained first, with democracy following more 
gradually [81].
Any discussion of economic determinants of corruption has to answer the questions 
of privatization, public sector wages, government regulations, democracy, and level 
of economic development. Privatization may have its clear economic advantages, but 
unfortunately, its impact on corruption is unclear. What happens is the shift of corrup-
tion from the public to the private sector. What was formerly taken from state-owned 
enterprises can then be extorted from private firms. Surely, the public sector corruption 
is certainly higher, for many reasons, than the private sector. At the top of these reasons 
is the wages where low public sector wages stimulate corruption among public sector 
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workers [82]. By the same token, it is likely that corruption correlates positively with the 
degree to which government regulations are vague and lax [83]. In contrast, Treisman 
found corruption is lower in economically developed well-established liberal democra-
cies, with a free press, and a high quota of women in governmental institutions, and 
an open and competitive global trade history [84]. The logical question here is under 
what conditions this result takes place. Does economic development reduce corrup-
tion? Alternatively, does corruption impede economic development? To what extent 
are both determined by some other factors? The general verified finding illustrates that 
when countries grow rich, they become less corrupt [85]. In other words, corruption 
is significantly correlated with the level of economic development (1999), a condition 
that makes policy reforms unmanageable. A country cannot wait forever to attain the 
economic development in order to control corruption [86].
The preceding debate tells us that differential effect of corruption is a neglected 
topic. For example, China has been able to grow faster than so many countries while 
being ranked among the most corrupt countries. Why corruption is less dangerous 
in China? Or would China have grown even faster if corruption was lower? These 
kinds of questions have received scant attention and need more investigations [87]. 
The same debate has to be raised with regard to democracy-corruption relation-
ship and to any other variable that is likely to affect corruption or be affected by it 
directly or indirectly. A more common and relevant predictor of corruption is the 
size of the government and state legitimacy. Bigger and illegitimate governments 
allow more bureaucracies and less legislative oversight and more corruption [26, 
88]. Nevertheless, it is not only the size of the government that explains the level 
of corruption but also whether the big government is democratic. The big size of 
government reduces corruption if democratic values and institutions prevail. In 
contrast, it expands corruption if it is undemocratic [89].
7.1 Generalizations
1. Countries that experience higher levels of rents also have higher levels of 
 corruption, with other things equal.
2. Decentralization of the government, its size and intervention in the market are 
important, but not sufficient, factors determining corruption.
3. Competition lowers the rents of economic transactions and therefore decreases 
corruption as motives to extract rents consequently decrease.
4. Economic development reduces corruption indirectly through the quality of 
education and rationalization of decision-making, which maximizes the cost 
of the corruption behavior.
5. Equal distributions of wealth mattered more than wealth itself as means of 
controlling corruption.
6. Administrative environments that are characterized by vague performance 
standards tend to have high levels of corruption.
7. Administrative environments that are dominated by meritocratic recruitment 
and promotion tend to have low levels of corruption.
8. A judiciary system where corrupt bureaucrats can be effectively charged 
 reduces the potential rewards of corruption and thus minimizes its level.
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9. The big size of the government does not lead directly to corruption; the rela-
tionship is strongly affected by existence of democracy that marginalizes the 
effect of government size.
10. The link between autocratic systems and corruption is complex, where toler-
ant autocratic governments create favorite conditions for bureaucratic corrup-
tion, consolidated autocracy tends to deter corruption.
11. The widely accepted definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for 
private gains reflects an ideological bias against state activity where national 
private sectors and global private business experience corruption as well.
8. The political level
I will discuss the prior literature of political level—similar to other levels—along 
two parallel tracks: the political theoretical frameworks of corruption and the 
empirical findings of political cross-national comparative studies. Both tracks will 
be simultaneously presented in a way that contributes to building the hierarchi-
cal universal theory of journalism/corruption determinants. Obviously, the most 
commonly examined political issue is democracy and democratization where the 
available evidences tentatively indicate the association between higher political 
competitiveness, democracy, and lower level of corruption; however, this effect is 
not linear. Some authoritarian countries actually experience slightly less corruption 
than countries at intermediate levels of democracy. Even authoritarian regimes do 
not have similar effect with regard to corruption behavior. Dictatorial regimes are 
significantly more corrupt than single-party and military regimes [90].
Following the transitional phase where countries enjoy more political competi-
tiveness, they tend to be less corrupt [74]. The general idea is that partial, young 
democracies or countries that experience the transition to consolidated democracy 
perform worse than authoritarian regimes and much worse than full or older democ-
racies [37, 91]. In support of this ideal view, Montinola and Jackman provide evidence 
that moderate levels of democracy do not reduce corruption if compared to autocratic 
regimes. After the transition period to democracy ends, democratic practices do curb 
corruption [10]. Consistent with this evidence, Ensung suggests that democracy in 
general decreases corruption with the exception of the early stages of the political 
liberalization that witnesses higher levels of corruption. His explanation assumes 
that it is the societal indicators of each society that determine how much democratic 
reforms can curb corruption [92]. In parallel, with these studies and results, political 
parties and its strength were also found to be deterring mechanisms. But, corruption 
prevails in the transition toward modernization where political parties are absent or 
have no influence on the public involvement in political decision-making [93]. In gen-
eral, political parties have been found to be behind the prevalence and spreading of 
corruption as they may reduce the risks of corruption acts [94]. From a political point 
of view, what influences corruption is not only democracy-related issues, but the 
overall social, political, and judicial institutions of a given country [20]. Corruption 
is no more than a contest between those who benefit and those who lose from this 
illegal and abnormal practices. These two partners reflect the socioeconomic struc-
ture in any society. Political changes, therefore, do not curb corruption unless they 
redesign the balance of power in favor of fighting corruption [140].
The overall result accordingly suggests a failure of the conceptual association 
posed between democracy and the reduction of corruption [95]. Yet, there exists a 
complementarity effect of democracy and press freedom. Democratic institutions 
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are much more effective in controlling corruption if the press is free, and free press 
can only be effective if politicians are accountable to the public [37, 96, 97]. Based on 
cross-country and panel data, Kalenborn and Lessmann show that conditionality mat-
ters, in the sense that press freedom is an important conditioning variable concerning 
the influence of democratic elections on corruption. Results of their study suggest 
a collaborative effect of democratic reforms and freedom of the press to provide 
unbiased information to the voters. Only in countries with high press freedom, voters 
are able to examine the corrupt behavior of politicians [98]. In this respect, scholars 
highlight three key democratic institutional factors that deter corruption: first, an 
increased number of veto players in the form of multiple legislative houses, indepen-
dent executive branches, and constitutional courts; second, heightened transparency 
that enables exposure of corrupt behavior and activates vertical and horizontal 
accountability; and third, strong and large ruling coalitions that disable monopoly 
[99]. Similarly, data indicate that democracy empowers electorate to remove leaders 
from office and thus mitigate the impeding effect corruption has on economic growth. 
Therefore, leaders of many democracies refrain from growth-damaging corruption 
because they are afraid of punishment at the upcoming election [100, 101].
Based on the preceding discussion, it is obvious that press freedom and democ-
ratization have a cooperative relationship. As countries become more democratic, 
the critical investigative role of the press is intensified. Subsequently, press role 
in curbing corruption increases [102]. Empirical studies that are based on cross-
sectional analyses confirm that free press role is intensified if it is accompanied 
with powerful horizontal political institutions able to hold corrupt official account-
able. The most obvious agency is the independent judiciary system that works to 
sustain the critical role of the press. The picture, then, is that no single factor can 
fight corruption alone. This fight requires a collaborative role of all accountability 
mechanisms [63, 103]. The picture, now, will be more confusing if we know that 
democracy may have dual effects on perception of government corruption. Results 
obtained from the study of democracy and citizens’ perception of government 
corruption find a significant relationship between macro institutional democracy 
and micro individual perceptions of government corruption. When conditional 
effects of rationality including both instrumental calculations and intrinsic values 
on corruption perceptions were considered, the opposite effect exists. Democracy 
reduces the perception of government as corrupt [104].
The main reason for the inconsistency among scholars can be partially 
explained in the light of the multidimensionality of the concept of “democracy” 
or “democratization.” Whereas free and competitive election deepens corruption, 
other aspects such as freedom of speech, free press and civil liberties control it. To 
tackle such issues, Hung-En Sung examined democracy-corruption relationship 
using the three major statistical forms in social sciences (linear, quadratic, and 
cubic) utilizing up-to-date data covering a larger number of countries. In general, 
he finds that democratization reduces corruption [92]. As well documented, the 
level of corruption is more likely to decrease in countries with strong democratic 
institutions, for many reasons. Democracy mitigates the negative consequences 
of corruption when it allows the voters through election to expel politicians who 
engage in corrupt practices [100]. Democratic governments, accordingly, facili-
tate economic growth and receive the political support they deserve. However, 
in many cases democratic governments can exploit democratic institutions, and 
manipulate a network of political support through buying the votes and providing 
bribes to voters [105].
The comparison between democratic and dictatorial systems extends to cover 
election campaigns. Researchers prove that since elections are often accompanied 
with the need to buy votes and bribe voters, it is likely that democratic systems are 
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more vulnerable to corruption than military, authoritarian and autocratic system. 
For sure, the incentive to finance political campaigns might be a good reason to 
the prevalence of corruption that never exists in dictatorial governments [106]. 
For me, this argument may need another look at the definition of corruption itself. 
Dictatorial political systems that threaten the freedom and dignity of human 
beings are the worst form of corruption regardless of whether they accommodate 
elections. Though the corrupt behavior of democratic election campaigns is 
unjustifiable, it is very naïve harm if compared to the negative consequences of 
the military and dictatorial systems that deprive citizens from their freedom and 
dignity. What is the privilege one can earn if he/she lost his dignity and personal 
freedom? What is the positive economic advantage the whole society can enjoy, 
if its citizens and institutions live under a dictatorial regime suppressing their 
basic human rights including the right in life? The narrow approach to political 
corruption is, then, misleading and has to consider dignity, human freedom, and 
self-determination issues.
Electoral rules, as another political dimension, are also not alike in their effect 
on corruption. Results suggest that the ballot structure, district magnitude, 
and the electoral formula have a strong influence on political corruption [75]. 
However, countries with higher electoral participation irrespective of the rules 
according to Adsera and his colleagues have lower levels of corruption [107]. In a 
similar vein, literature extensively examined the impact of political institutions 
and specifically political accountability mechanisms on good governance and 
corruption. Three main features have been identified in the political system that 
heavily affect corruption: the degree of competition in the political system, the 
existence of checks and balance mechanisms across different branches of govern-
ment, and the transparency of the system. Results show that political institutions 
are extremely significant in determining the level of corruption: democracy, 
parliamentary systems, political stability, freedom of the press are all associated 
with lower corruption [108].
8.1 Generalizations
1. There is no direct and straightforward relationship between political competi-
tiveness and corruption. The level of corruption is higher in countries with 
intermediate levels of political competition than in fully democratic or author-
itarian countries.
2. The influence of the electoral institutions on corruption depends on the plural-
ity voting system that enables higher level of the individual accountability.
3. Prevalence and persistence of corruption depend on the interaction between 
three major factors: (1) a discretionary power that enables an authority to 
tailor the policies and regulation in a discretionary way, (2) extraction of rents 
by the abuse of the discretionary power, and (3) lack of or weak horizontal and 
vertical accountability agencies.
4. Political stability does not influence corruption directly. It leaves its effect on 
both the quality of political institutions and the efficiency of judicial authority, 
which decrease the degree of compliance with regulations.
5. Literature does offer contradicting results of the causal relationship between 
party system and corruption. High political parties’ competition may cause 
corruption and corruption may heighten political parties’ competition.
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6. The likelihood of corruption development increases where state capability in 
the areas of law enforcement and control is imperfect especially in times of 
social and political transformation.
7. The institutional historical contextual approach to political transformation 
provides evidence that democratization does not serve as a mechanism against 
corruption.
8. Democracy may reduce corruption indirectly through the creation of voters’ 
enabling environment that allows them to remove corrupt regime from office.
9. In general, democratization lowers the level of corruption; however, an 
 increase in corruption is expected during the early stages of democratization.
10. The effect of democratization in curbing corruption depends largely on the 
integrity of the society and the strength of both the state and society.
11. In many cases, corrupt governments manipulate government bodies and officials 
to the extent they can gain the public support through illegal networks.
9. The cultural level
The cultural level analysis of corruption means that it is rooted in the long-term 
historical structural determinants that reside beyond the current occurrences and 
events. It also acknowledges the fact that corruption results from noneconomic 
and nonpolitical factors that include cultural and religious determinants. Thirdly, 
it indicates that attitudes toward corruption vary across cultures. Where some 
cultures totally reject corruption, some others may justify it. As Alejandro Moreno 
states, justification of corruption is based on different cultural basis. It is highly 
accepted in post-Communist societies, followed by Latin American and South 
Asian countries [109]. This result bears some implications to the link between the 
degree of permissiveness toward corruption, which has a cultural reference, and 
level of democracy. It says that justification of corruption is wider in nondemocratic 
cultures than in democratic ones. Finally, the cultural level analysis directly or 
indirectly implies some sort of ethical violation to the norms as accepted standards 
and behaviors that stand for ideals of good and virtue [110].
Education, for example, has been proven to be a real cause behind reduction of 
corruption [111]. It shapes other factors responsible for promoting honesty, and a 
sense of identity with the entire country rather than with specific cliques or groups 
[112]. In addition, higher levels of education has been found to generate greater 
levels of wealth and equality for countries, both of which are associated with lower 
levels of corruption [113]. Sociologists in contrast to political scientists, economists, 
and journalism scientists focus on cultural variables including trust in public 
institutions and a generalized trust as a social capital, dominance of religious values 
versus nonreligious values, unequal distribution of power and wealth, acceptance 
of nepotism, level of education, role of religion, and many other cultural factors.
Cultural values are very difficult to change over time and thus as Hofstede 
explains are uncontrollable and it is unwise to fight corruption through a cultural 
change process [114]. Based on his results, Husted draws a profile of the corrupt 
society as one that enjoys high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and 
high masculinity [86]. Power distance is the extent to which powerless people per-
ceive and accept the unequal distribution of power in a culture. In such a culture, 
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the inferiors rely on their superiors in the form of paternalism, which is a main 
cause of corruption in a society. Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which 
members of a culture feel threatened by unpredictable environment where corrup-
tion can be seen as a way to minimize uncertainty and avoid threat. Masculinity 
refers to, among other things, a materialized society where the basic measure of 
success is money as opposed to interest to the quality of life. The more the society is 
materialized, the more tendency it has to corruption [86].
Religion as a cultural component defining societies receives little attention as a 
determinant of corruption with radically contradicted results. It is my conviction 
that all religions prohibit corruption and view it as a dangerous crime, but the 
eventual impact of the religion depends on its ability to shape social norms and 
the role of the latter to control behaviors, especially, those in power. In her study, 
Shadabi uses data of 174 countries in 2010 and all of the economic and noneco-
nomic control variables were considered in its cross-sectional estimations. The 
results show that religion has no effect on corruption [115]. The neutral position 
of religion in the fight against corruption has to be extended by more comparative 
studies across religions. Does Islam, for example, have the same neutral effect simi-
lar to Judaism and Christianity? What about Hinduism and Buddhism? Do they 
have the same neutral effect on corruption? Are disbelievers or seculars more or 
less corrupt than believers? I do believe that the neutral effect of religion is due to 
the fact that corruption is committed more by the elite, those who hold the author-
ity, who are less committed to the religious values if compared to the religious 
grassroots who are the victims.
Interestingly, is the effect of women’ participation in government on corruption 
where higher rates of women’ involvement in politics lead to lower levels of corrup-
tion. The justification is given by two different studies conducted by Robert Gatti 
and associate and Swamy and associates. Both suggest that women have on average 
a less tolerant attitude toward corruption [116, 117]. The problem with cultural fac-
tors is that it changes slowly and the value system may take decades to bring about 
very little changes. As such, it is very difficult to rely on cultural changes to fight 
corruption. Culture consists of orientations to action in particular ways. People 
acquire cultural values through lifelong socialization. Therefore, if a society experi-
ences dramatic changes in terms of its politics and economy, the persistent cultural 
values may hamper the expected impact of economic and political liberalization 
on corruption. Communism, for example, had produced a culture of corruption 
to the extent that the entire populations had been socialized into values and tradi-
tions making corruption an integral part of their life style. Those cultural heritages 
of communism were unlikely to merely disappear with the new political values 
that produced them [118]. This obvious problem does not deny the role of culture 
in determining corruption and its decisive influence. Society is built on norms. 
Norms are standards of anticipated behaviors that also control the way we interact 
with each other. Our behavior is mainly influenced by our perception of norms. 
Our rejection or acceptance of the corrupt behavior depends largely on the norms 
that cultivate our worldview [71]. Another relevant cultural determinant is income 
inequality that creates an atmosphere in which corruption develops and flourishes. 
Whereas the rich have many opportunities to enter into corrupt behaviors and 
abuse their power to gain personal benefits, the poor struggle to stand against the 
rich. The ultimate result is the production of public policies that favor the interests 
of the powerful elites at the expense of marginalized people. The relationship of 
income inequality with corruption is complex. On the one hand, corruption intensi-
fies inequalities in income distribution [119] and on the other, income distribution 
inequality significantly increases the level of corruption [120]. The empirical 
evidence of the influence of inequality comes from the study of Jong-sung and 
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Khagram who found that inequality is as significant as economic factors in deter-
mining and explaining corruption [121].
9.1 Generalizations
1. There is an association between the levels of trust among the people and the 
level of corruption. Higher trust leads to lower corruption.
2. Religion has a neutral effect on corruption, with other things equal.
3. All religions prohibit corruption; yet, its potential impact is little and insuffi-
cient as a single factor in the matrix of corruption fighting.
4. Level of corruption is more affected by the long-lived sociocultural structures 
than the current state policies.
5. Increasing level of education without well-developed civil monitoring insti-
tutions leads to higher level of corruption as it increases agents’ rent-seeking 
capacity.
6. Income inequality is likely to be a significant and no less central determinant of 
corruption than economic and political factors.
7. Empowerment of women through increasing female participation in politics 
and decision-making circles would result in less corruption.
10. The international system level
The conventional wisdom says that the natural cure for corruption is the 
existence of competition, which is a natural product of international openness. In 
perfectly competitive markets, outcomes of economic revenues are not subject to 
the exploitation and manipulation by market actors and thus there is no room for 
corruption [122]. The standard expectation is that more openness through inter-
national trade curbs corruption because states competing globally have to have the 
norms and culture of global business environment, mainly the rule of law, account-
ability agencies, and transparency to attract business [123]. The empirical analysis 
of the relationship between trade openness and corruption is rare. Ades and Di 
Tella find that corruption is higher in countries where domestic firms are protected 
by natural and administrative barriers to trade [74]. Similarly, Larrain and Tavares 
provide evidence supporting the negative effect of openness on corruption, that is, 
more openness leads to less corruption [122]. Sandholtz and Gray reach the same 
conclusion when they provide evidence supporting their hypothesis stating that 
greater degree of international integration lowers levels of corruption. They analyze 
data from 150 countries that support the justification of the role of international 
integration in importing cultural norms that deter corruption and alters the costs 
and benefits of engaging in corrupt acts [124].
In a parallel vein, other empirical findings lend significant support to the positive 
relationship between openness and good governance [125–128]. Statistical analysis 
proves that openness to foreign trade significantly hinders corruption [126, 129]. 
However, the size of the effect is very small. A real difference to a country’s level of 
perceived corruption would require a substantial integration in global trade rather 
than a little change [130]. One measure of competitive pressures is the integration 
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of a country into the global economy. If competition reduces corruption, then 
increased openness to international trade and investment should go along with less 
corruption [8]. According to an empirical study, it has been found that globalization 
is a powerful weapon against corruption only for middle- and high-income coun-
tries, while for low-income countries it has no significant impact. For such countries, 
fighting corruption requires additional global action aiming at the reduction of 
poverty [131]. There are good reasons for why globalization minimizes corruption 
as it exposes the globalized country to anti-corruption norms. The international 
networks of Western countries transmit the anti-corruption values to countries con-
nected to globalization [124]. Sandholtz and Gray report that the more international 
organizations a country belongs to and the longer it has been a part of the major 
international institutions, such as the United Nations, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO), and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the lower its level of corruption [124]. There is no doubt that 
social and political openness enhance information availability to a number of new 
players in politics. Yet, according to the study of [91] Charron, impact of social and 
political openness on corruption is conditioned by domestic factors.
In a slightly different thread of research, Mukherjee concludes that greater 
economic globalization does not reduce bureaucratic corruption. However, he 
argues that this finding does not necessarily deny the importance of global trade 
engagement. Rather, it reflects that curbing corruption is not only an outcome of 
integration in global economy that stems from a nexus of complicated and hierar-
chical bureaucracy [132]. Consistent with this view, Gatti tested the conventional 
wisdom that international openness reduces corruption by analyzing whether the 
presence of obstacles to international trade and capital flows is correlated with 
higher level of corruption and found no evidence to support his hypothesis. Instead, 
his conclusion states that the main impact stems from the incentives of collusive 
behaviors between the two partners: individuals and customs officials, rather than 
from the restrictive trade policy that lowers the openness and foreign competition 
[127]. Another international factor that seems to affect the level of corruption is the 
colonial heritage. Studies show that countries that were British colonies have signifi-
cantly lower perceived corruption. This is because most former British colonies have 
common law systems [130]. In the light of the debate of global trade and corrup-
tion, it seems that the only verified result of international openness and corruption 
is simply it depends on the wider cultural and sociopolitical context.
The most dangerous international source and determinant of corruption, I 
argue, is the double standards employed by the United States and other powerful 
European countries against the weak and developing countries. If corruption as 
Gerald Caiden argues takes place when things are not what they ought to be [14], 
then, violation of international law by any state should be seen as corruption. In this 
context, the Israeli occupation of Palestine since 1948 right now with full support 
of United States and several European countries is by definition the worst form of 
corruption [133]. Within the past 70 years or so, Israel has occupied Palestine and 
was permitted to invade and attack numerous neighboring countries with full sup-
port of the United States and several European countries, without any true positive 
interference from the U.N or Security Council [134]. The illegitimacy of the Israeli 
occupation provides the legal justification for defending and interpreting all other 
issues pertaining to the dilemma of the Palestinians, including all acts of resistance 
since they are in line with the right of self-determination [133].
In a similar vein, Karen Del Biondo provides evidence that there have been 
double standards in the EU’s reactions to the violations of democratic principles 
in 10 African countries. The similar violations of democratic principles by Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
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Zimbabwe received dissimilar reactions to protect the self-interested objectives of 
the EU [135]. An up-to-date example of the international corruption according to 
my suggested definition is the intervention of USA and several European countries 
to suppress the Arab Spring revolutions. The serious consequences of such interfer-
ence are reflected in the decline of press freedom and civil liberties, lack of rule of 
law and accountability agencies which, in turn, worsen the level and magnitude of 
corruption. In other words, the systemic corruption of the developing countries 
could be partially attributed to foreign policies of some Western countries that seek 
to serve their own interests at the expense of the rights of the marginalized peoples 
of the East. Hindering democratic transformation in developing countries under 
any justification may not serve the developed countries themselves. Corruption 
is one of the main causes behind poverty, unemployment, poor quality of life, 
depression, and all social and political and economic problems the whole society, 
especially youth suffer from [136]. What I like to stress is the fact that some of 
Western countries through their foreign policies that work against the aspirations of 
peoples of developing countries toward freedom, democracy, and dignity increase 
corruption in such countries, which eventually harms the West. Supporting non-
democratic governments equals defending corruption as dictators make no distinc-
tion between their own wealth and that of their countries [24]. Nondemocratic 
governors are above the law and cannot be held accountable. As such, the best 
international policy for fighting corruption is to promote real democratic systems 
that respect the rule of law, enhance accountability, press freedom, civil liberties, 
and social and economic justice.
Adding the international domain in the analysis of corruption is obviously justi-
fied by the current research that has tended to be fragmented. Scholars often exhibit 
little familiarity in areas of research other than their own fields [24, 137, 138]. As a 
result, progress in explaining this cancer or coronavirus pandemic that is damaging 
the fabric of any hope for stability, democracy, and welfare will continue without 
a real cure. I therefore, suggest that the starting point is to reconsider a new defini-
tion of corruption embracing the dynamic collaboration among the five hierarchal 
layers with emphasis on the highest level, the international. I also assume that: (1) 
The double standards policies of some powerful Western states are in stark contrast 
with any international anti-corruption policy the World Bank, IMF and other inter-
national and regional organizations adopt to fight corruption. (2) The incredible 
illegal support of USA to Israeli’s occupation of Palestine is the main source of cor-
ruption in Arab countries that delay projects of political and economic development 
over seven decades with the hope to free Palestine. Unfortunately, their efforts in 
the two fronts lead to a big failure. (3) Western countries’ position against the aspi-
rations of developing countries for freedom, rule of law, dignity, and democracy 
perpetuates the systemic corruption and helps export terrorism and migration to 
the West. (4) I, therefore, presume that emphasis on the missing part of corruption 
studies, the international dimension, will provide a perfect insight on how to under-
stand the mechanisms through which corruption works. It is a vicious cycle through 
which causes of corruption trickle down from the upper to the lower level and to 
the bottom, journalism as depicted in the graph of the hierarchal universal theory. 
The ultimate result of this cycle is a type of journalism that enters into strong and 
permanent alliance with corrupt and dictatorial governments. Journalism is a key 
factor affecting vertical and horizontal accountability institutions. Not only this, 
but it defends the wrongdoing of corrupt officials and serves against any peaceful 
means to change them or hold them accountable. Since, corruption as reviewed here 
is an economic, political, and cultural issue expressing a big failure of the whole 
society, journalism performance also decreases the risks and costs of corruption and 
publicizes the impunity culture that tolerates the corruptible.
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The corrupt journalism serves mainly to suppress diversity, particularly, the 
opposition voices while maintaining and strengthening its ties with corrupt alli-
ances, supporting monopoly, discretion and attacking accountability. This analysis 
illustrates to a large extent the penetration of journalism influences into the fabric 
of the three major ingredients of formula of corruption suggested by Klitgaard who 
see corruption as monopoly + discretion – accountability ([25], p. 75).
10.1 Generalizations
1. Globalization exerts a powerful impact on decreasing corruption in high- or 
middle-income countries; however, it has no impact in low-income countries.
2. A substantial opening to foreign trade is required to lower corruption signifi-
cantly, while a marginal shift does not make a difference.
3. The level of corruption is negatively correlated with the legal cultures of the 
former colonial heritage.
4. International quantitative trade constraints shift the economy from directly 
productive activities to unproductive rent seeking activities.
5. Corrupt behaviors grow and flourish in closed economies, while countries 
involved in international economy expose themselves to all types of controls 
that minimize corruption.
6. In many cases, globalization has increased corruption as it involves a low level 
of risk discovery and penalty which encourages a high benefit of bribery and 
profit.
7. Occupation of Palestinian state by Israel represents the worst from of inter-
national corruption that violates the international law and the international 
humanitarian laws.
8. Defending the Israeli occupation for Palestinian state by USA and some power-
ful European states works against the aims of all international agencies that 
fight corruption including World Bank and IMF.
9. Any effort from USA and some powerful European states to hinder the revolu-
tions of developing countries is an effort to perpetuate corruption and increase 
the likelihood of migration and terrorism that they are currently suffering from.
11.  Building a hierarchal universal theory of journalism-corruption 
determinants
“The hierarchical universal theory of journalism/corruption determinants” 
intends to accommodate the various variables and underlying relations affecting 
corruption organized in a continuum from macro-international to micro-journal-
istic or individual level. In our effort to build the theory, we went—right now—
through three steps: (1) The first step identifies the five interactive hierarchical 
levels of influences. (2) The second step reviews the most relevant empirical studies 
carried out in each level. (3) The third step introduces the generalizations/the 
results obtained from the empirical studies/existing literature. (4) The remaining 
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step (the fourth) intends to synthesize the main cross-border hypotheses that create 
linkages capable to explain corruption, predict it, direct the future studies, and 
finally contribute to reducing it.
The challenging question is how to study variables pertaining to several levels 
interacting together to restrain or spread corruption. This question suggests a 
conceptual universal cross-cultural, multidisciplinary perspective beyond the 
traditionally single studies dedicated to examining a direct liner relationship 
within a specific level or sublevel. A levels-of-analysis perspective, as suggested 
by Thomas Hanitzsch, has been promising in sketching a universal framework for 
large-scale comparative analysis [139]. In this respect, Stephen Reese argues-in his 
conceptualization of the hierarchical influences approach—that is dedicated only to 
global journalism studies—that most research is not planned to examine variables 
attached to all levels of influence once. However, scholars can consider a multilevel 
interpretation of their results or actually take a further step to account for interac-
tion among hierarchical levels [140]. The hierarchal theory shows to what extent 
there is a need to redirect corruption research to understand how it works to help 
them contribute to policies and initiatives of corruption fighting.
12. Cross-border hypotheses
Before stating such hypotheses and closing this chapter, it is important to empha-
size some cautions. (1) As is obvious, it is beyond my capacity, time and space limit 
to review all relevant theoretical and empirical works that fit into each level of analy-
sis. Given the richness and unlimited scholarship produced on the subject, it would 
be impossible to cover all at once. The aim of my attempt is to redesign a new theory 
that aims at drawing a universal map for what has been carried out and what is still 
missing. What is important is the conceptual framework and methodological under-
pinnings that future research can consider. (2) Despite the fact that multidisciplinary 
international comparative studies are the recommended type of research to test the 
cross-border hypotheses, other types of research studies and methods, quantitative 
and qualitative, single cases using different indexes measuring corruption through 
one point of time or longitudinal studies are of added value for understanding cor-
ruption. (3) The approach we adopt in building this theory is based on the concept of 
science as a dynamic process of critical thinking, raising questions, and formulating 
hypotheses and not a body of knowledge. It is a matter of identifying the possible 
relationships between variables we can empirically observe and test [141]. (4) The 
following list of hypotheses is just initial step in the ongoing research and conceptual 
work that helps understand journalism-corruption determinants in their compre-
hensive framework. They are not by any definition a comprehensive view.
1. As journalism institutions become more restricted in nondemocratic countries 
that exhibit the least competitive markets, along with the least international 
economic integration and the lowest level of education, corruption will expand 
and flourish in all spheres of life.
2. The more democratic institutions are, and the more rule of law and account-
ability mechanisms exist, the more free and independent journalism institu-
tions become and the less corruption levels prevail.
3. Journalism conditions and specifically its freedom, diversity, and inde-
pendence are closely related to higher levels of economic and political 
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 competitions and higher levels of social capital and international integration 
and lower levels of corruption.
4. The watchdog role of journalism enhances good governance, rule of law, account-
ability, less levels of income inequality and hence lower levels of corruption.
5. Alliances between USA, powerful European nations, and dictators in develop-
ing countries are related to diffusion of state-owned and captured journalism, 
centralized governments, lower levels of transparency, and, hence, higher 
levels of corruption.
6. As totalitarian and authoritarian systems prevail, monopoly and centraliza-
tion dominate, bureaucracy and public sector increase, the closed economies 
exist, and corruption diffuses in all domains of life.
7. As double standards in international politics dominate, sources of corruption 
develop, and alliances between ruling elites in developed and developing coun-
tries strengthen, journalism institutions are more likely to serve the interests of 
the elites at the expense of the general public, and the divide between the rich 
and the poor widens, leading to higher levels of corruption.
8. As educational and cultural levels of the general public increase, journalism 
ethical performance prevails, its watchdog role intensifies, democratic and ac-
countability institutions and practices are more likely to exist, and corruption 
levels decrease.
9. As social networks penetration increase, vertical accountability dominates, 
rule of law enhances, the cost of corrupt behavior grows, and incidence of cor-
ruption reduces.
10. Watchdog journalism is more likely to have a preventive effect of corruption in 
a context where vertical and horizontal accountability exist, anti-corruption 
norms prevail, discretionary power of the elites is at its minimum, and finally 
where the judicial system offers higher level of corruption penalty.
11. Journalists’ autonomy and safety are prerequisites in the fight against cor-
ruption as independent investigative reports threaten and damage the hori-
zontal and vertical cooperation between the corrupt agencies in the corrupt 
states. However, without independent judiciary system, and strong civil 
society, the corrupt authority will suppress the independent and free voices 
of journalism.
12. Perception of corruption as a proxy for actual corruption should not be taken 
for granted. In corrupt regimes where journalism is owned, controlled, and 
operated by corrupt ruling elites, corruption crimes and accusations are used 
as conspiracy tool in the hands of dictators to manipulate the public mind and 
distract the attention from focusing on efforts of regime change.
13. Though systemic corruption is rooted in the historical, cultural, and political 
structure, policy changes and definitely mass education and press freedom can 
help in reducing corruption.
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14. Press freedom, democracy, rule of law, horizontal and vertical accountabil-
ity, women empowerment, global openness, and education are complements 
rather than substitutes in their fight against corruption.
15. Press freedom causes less corruption; however, lower corruption level is an 
indicator of a healthy social, cultural, political, and economic environment 
that serves as a real cause for enhancing press freedom. As such, the direction 
of causation runs from lower corruption to higher press freedom as well.
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